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Abstract
A minimum cost spanning tree problem analyzes how to e ciently connect a
group of individuals to a source. Once the e cient tree is obtained, the ad-
dressed question is how to allocate the total cost among the involved agents.
One prominent solution in allocating this minimum cost is the so-called Folk
solution. Unfortunately, in general, the Folk solution is not easy to compute.
We identify a class of mcst problems in which the Folk solution is obtained
in an easy way.
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1. Introduction
We consider a situation in which some individuals, located at di↵erent
places, want to be connected to a source in order to obtain a good or ser-
vice. Each link joining two individuals, or any individual to the source, has
a specific fixed cost. Moreover, individuals do not mind being connected
directly to the source, or indirectly through other individuals. There are
several methods to obtain a way of connecting agents to the source so that
the total cost of the selected network is minimum (Prim’s algorithm (Prim,
1957), for instance). This situation is known as the minimum cost spanning
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tree problem (hereafter mcst problem) and it is used to analyze di↵erent
real-life issues, from telephone and cable TV to water supply networks.
An important question is how this minimum cost should be allocated
among the individuals. One prominent solution to solve the allocation of
this cost is the so-called Folk solution. To compute this solution, first we
need to calculate the irreducible costs and, in order to do that, we have to
compare all paths from any two nodes (individuals) and solve a min´max
problem. Then, we have to compute the Shapley value of the cooperative
game defined throughout the irreducible costs, or to apply the closed-form
obtained in Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010).
We define a class of mcst problems (that we call simple mcst problems)
in which the Folk solution only depends on the cost of each individual to the
source and the cost to the nearest partner, that is, the minimum connection
cost of this individual. We obtain a closed-form (easy to obtain) of the Folk
solution that does not need to compute the irreducible costs. Finally, we
extend the class of mcst problems where this procedure can be applied.
2. Definitions
2.1. Minimum cost spanning tree
A minimum cost spanning tree problem involves a finite set of agents,
N “ t1, 2, . . . , nu, who need to be connected to a source !. We denote by N!
the set of agents and the source, i.e. N! “ NYt!u. The agents are connected
by edges and for i ‰ j, cij P R` represents the cost of the edge eij “ pi, jq
connecting agents i, j P N. We denote by cii the cost of connecting directly
agent i to the source, for all i P N. Let C “ rcijsnˆn be the nˆ n symmetric
cost matrix. The mcst problem is represented by the pair pN!,Cq.
A spanning tree over pN!,Cq is an undirected graph p with no cycles that
connects all elements of N!. We can identify a spanning tree with a map
p : N Ñ N! so that j “ ppiq is the agent (or the source) whom i connects.
This map p defines the edges epij “ pi, ppiqq in the tree. In a spanning tree
each agent is (directly or indirectly) connected to the source !; that is, for
all i P N there is some t P N such that ptpiq “ !. Moreover, given a spanning
tree p, there is a unique path from any i to the source for all i P N, given by
the edges pi, ppiqq, pppiq, p2piqq, . . . , ppt´1piq, ptpiq “ !q. The cost of building
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the spanning tree p is the total cost of the edges in this tree; that is,
Cp “
nÿ
i“1
cippiq
Prim (1957) provides an algorithm which solves the problem of connecting
all agents to the source such that the total cost of the network is minimum.
The achieved solution, the minimum cost spanning tree, may not be unique.
Denote by m a tree with minimum cost and by Cm its cost. That is, for all
spanning trees p
Cm “
nÿ
i“1
cimpiq § Cp “
nÿ
i“1
cippiq
Given a subset S Ñ N , we will denote by CmpSq the minimum cost of the
mcst sub-problem pS!, C|Sq. Let us denote by C! the cost of the tree in
which every individual joins directly the source, C! “ ∞iPN cii. And, for
any individual i P N , ci˚ represents the minimum connection cost of such an
individual (interpreted as the cost to the nearest partner), ci˚ “ minjPN cij.
Once a minimum cost spanning tree is constructed, the important issue
is how to allocate the associated cost Cm among the agents.
A cost sharing rule for mcst problems is a function that proposes for any
mcst problem pN!,Cq P Nn an allocation ↵pN!,Cq “ p↵1,↵2, . . . ,↵nq P Rn,
such that
nÿ
i“1
↵i “ Cm.
2.2. The Folk solution
Many solutions have been defined in themcst literature (see, for instance,
Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2008) for definitions and a comparative anal-
ysis). We will focus on the so-called Folk solution proposed independently
by Feltkamp et al. (1994) and Bergantin˜os and Vidal-Puga (2007). We will
denote this solution by F pN!,Cq. It can be obtained as the Shapley value
of the stand-alone game associated with the irreducible cost matrix defined
by:
c˚ij “ min
Pij
max
ePPij
tcpequ
where Pij are paths from i to j, e P Pij is an edge in this path, and cpeq
is the cost of this edge. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2010) provide a closed-
form expression of the Folk solution: for individual i order increasingly the
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irreducible costs of connecting this individual to other n´ 1 agents, so that
c˚1i § c˚2i § . . . § c˚pn´1qi . Then, the Folk solution is
FipN!,Cq “ ci˚i
n
`
n´1ÿ
k“1
1
kpk ` 1q mintc
˚k
i , c
˚
iiu (1)
2.3. Simple mcst problems
Definition 1. Elementary cost matrix
A mcst problem pN!,Cq is said to be an elementary cost mcst problem
if for all i, j P N , cij P tc1, c2u. We will denote an elementary cost mcst
problem by pN!,Ceq.
Remark 1. Usually, elementary cost matrices are defined such that c1 “ 0
and c2 “ 1. The general case c1 § c2, low and high cost, is also known as
2´mcst problems (Este´vez-Ferna´ndez and Reijnierse, 2014).
Definition 2. Autonomous component
Given a mcst problem pN!,Cq, with minimum connecting cost Cm, a subset
S Ñ N is said to be:
• autonomous if Cm “ CmpSq ` CmpNzSq;
• an autonomous component if it is autonomous and has no au-
tonomous subset; if T Ñ S, T ‰ S, then T is not autonomous.
Remark 2. Note that if S is autonomous, so is NzS. The Folk solution
provides the same allocation to individual i in the whole problem or if applied
to an autonomous component S, with i P S
Fi pS!, C|Sq “ FipN,Cq, for all i P S, S autonomous component
Therefore we can solve separately the (smaller) problems pS!, C|Sq for au-
tonomous components. Note that mcst problems with elementary cost matri-
ces may have several autonomous components (see Example 1).
Definition 3. Simple mcst problem
Given a mcst problem pN!,Cq, it is said to be simple if the cost matrix C
is elementary and the set of all individuals N is an autonomous component.
We will denote a simple mcst problem by pN!,Csq.
Remark 3. Obviously N is always autonomous. If it is an autonomous
component, it is the unique autonomous component in the mcst problem.
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3. The result
The following result shows that in simple mcst problems it is possible
to obtain the Folk solution only taking into account, for each individual
i P N the cost of connecting this individual to the source, cii, and the cost
to connect with the nearest partner ci˚ .
Theorem 1. Given a simple mcst problem pN!,Csq,
a) If cii “ c1 ñ FipN!,Csq “ c1
b) If ci˚ “ c2 ñ FipN!,Csq “ c2
c) If cii “ c2 and ci˚ “ c1 ñ FipN!,Csq “ c2 ´ C! ´ Cmn3 ,
where n3 “ |ti P N : cii “ c2 and ci˚ “ c1u|
Proof. Let us consider a simple mcst problem pN!,Csq, and let m a mini-
mum cost spanning tree with cost Cm.
a) If an individual i is such that cii “ c1. In this case, ci˚i “ c1 and, for all
k, mintc˚ki , ci˚iu “ c1. Then, if we apply equation (1) to obtain the Folk
solution we get
FipN!,Csq “ ci˚i
n
`
n´1ÿ
k“1
1
kpk ` 1q mintc
˚k
i , c
˚
iiu “ c1n `
n´1ÿ
k“1
1
kpk ` 1qc1 “
“ c1
n
` c1
n´1ÿ
k“1
„
1
k
´ 1
k ` 1
⇢
“ c1
n
` c1
ˆ
1´ 1
n
˙
“ c1
b) If ci˚ “ c2, then ci˚j “ c2, for all j “ 1, 2, . . . , n and by reasoning as in the
previous case we obtain
FipN!,Csq “ c2
c) Let us suppose the existence of two individuals in this case such that
for some k, ci˚k † cj˚k. This implies ci˚k “ cik “ c1, cj˚k “ cjk “ c2, and
ci˚j “ cij “ c2. If cjmpjq “ c2, we may define the spanning tree p such that
it coincides with m except in that ppjq “ !. Then Cm “ Cp and N is not
an autonomous component, a contradiction. In other case, if cjmpjq “ c1,
we have two possibilities for the minimum cost spanning tree m:
c1) Individual i is closer to the source than individual j, that is
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. . . . . .j i . . . !
c1
Then, there is some j1 between j and i such that cj1mpj1q “ c2 and we
may define the spanning tree p such that it coincides with m except
in that ppj1q “ !. Then Cm “ Cp and N is not an autonomous
component, a contradiction.
c2) Individual j is closer to the source than individual i. By reasoning in
a similar way as in the previous case c1q, we obtain a contradiction.
So, for all k, ci˚k “ cj˚k and applying equation (1) the Folk solution allocates
the same amount to both individuals.
To obtain the allocation of these individuals, note that if we call n1 the
number of individuals that are in case aq and n2 the number of individuals
in case bq, then individuals in case cq should pay
R “ Cm ´ n1c1 ´ n2c2 “ Cm ´ C! ` n3c2
As the Folk solution allocates the same amount to any individual in this
group, then
FipN!,Csq “ R
n3
“ c2 ´ C! ´ Cm
n3
the required result.
The following example shows that the result in Theorem 1 cannot be
applied to elementary cost mcst problems, since they can lead to di↵erent
autonomous components. Nevertheless, every elementary cost mcst problem
can be obtained as union of simple problems.
Example 1. Let us consider the following mcst problem
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2
1 !
1
1
1
1
1
0
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A minimum cost spanning tree (Cm “ 2) is given by function m defined as:
mp1q “ ! mp2q “ 3 mp3q “ !; Cm “ c11 ` c23 ` c33 “ 2.
32 1!
0 1
1
The Folk solution provides the allocation F “ p1, 1{2, 1{2q. Observe that the
problem is not simple since it has two autonomous components, N1 “ t1u,
N2 “ t2, 3u. However, the proposal provided in Theorem 1 coincides with the
Folk solution.
Now, we extend the class of mcst problems in which the result in Theo-
rem 1 can be obtained by allowing problems with several autonomous compo-
nents. It is important to note that, as every elementary costmcst problem, or
2´mcst problem, can be decomposed in autonomous components, Corollary
1 provides a way of finding the Folk solution in this class of problems.
Definition 4. A mcst problem pN!,Cq is simple-decomposable if it is
possible to split N
N “ N1 YN2 Y . . .YNr, Ni XNj “ H, for i ‰ j
such that
Cm pN!,Cq “
rÿ
t“1
Cm
`pNtq!, C|Nt˘
and everymcst sub-problem
`pNtq!, C|Nt˘ is simple. We will denote a simple-
decomposable mcst problem by pN!,Cs-decq. Each mcst simple sub-problem`pNtq!, C|Nt˘ is called a simple component of pN!,Cq.
We will denote the high cost in every simple component
`pNtq!, C|Nt˘ by
c2ptq and the lower cost by c1ptq. Then, as a direct consequence of Theorem
1 and Remark 2, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. Given a simple-decomposable mcst problem pN!,Cs-decq,
for any individual i P N , let Nt the simple component such that i P Nt. Then
1) If cii “ c1ptq ñ FipN!,Csq “ c1ptq
2) If ci˚ “ c2ptq ñ FipN!,Csq “ c2ptq
3) If cii “ c2ptq and ci˚ “ c1ptq ñ FipN!,Csq “ c2ptq ´ Eptqn3ptq ,
where
Eptq “ C!pNtq ´ CmpNtq, n3ptq “ |ti P Nt : cii “ c2ptq and ci˚ “ c1ptqu|
7
Acknowledgments.
Financial support from Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness
under Project EC02013-43119 is gratefully acknowledged.
Personal acknowledgments will be included.
References
Bergantin˜os, G., Vidal-Puga, J. J., 2007. A fair rule in minimum cost span-
ning tree problems. Journal of Economic Theory 137 (1), 326–352.
Bergantin˜os, G., Vidal-Puga, J. J., 2008. On some properties of cost allo-
cation rules in minimum cost spanning tree problems. Czech Economic
Review 2 (3), 251–267.
Bogomolnaia, A., Moulin, H., 2010. Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree:
Beyond the folk solution. Games and Economic Behavior 69 (2), 238–248.
Este´vez-Ferna´ndez, A., Reijnierse, H., 2014. On the core of cost-revenue
games: Minimum cost spanning tree games with revenues. European Jour-
nal of Operational Research 237 (2), 606 – 616.
Feltkamp, V., Tijs, S., Muto, S., 1994. On the irreducible core and the equal
remaining obligations rule of minimum cost spanning extension problems.
Tech. rep.
Prim, R. C., 1957. Shortest connection network and some generalization. Bell
System Tech. J. 36, 1389–1401.
8
PUBLISHED ISSUES
WP1101 ’Fair School Placement’
J. Alcalde, A. Romero-Medina.
WP1102 ’Does Stock Return Predictability A↵ect ESO Fair Value’
J. Carmona, A. Leon, A. Vaello-Sebastia.
WP1103 ’Competition for Procurement Shares’
J. Alcalde, M. Dahm.
WP1201 ’The Minimal Overlap Rule: Restrictions on Mergers for Creditors’ Consensus’
J. Alcalde, M. Marco-Gil, J.A. Silva.
WP1202 ’Mediation in Bankruptcy Problems’
J. Peris, J.M. Jimenez-Gomez.
WP1203 ’A rmative Action and School Choice’
J. Alcalde, B. Subiza
WP1204 ’M-stability: A Reformulation of Von Neumann-Morgenstern Stability’
J. Peris, B. Subiza
WP1205 ’Stability Versus Rationality in Choice Functions’
B. Subiza, J. Peris.
WP1206 ’Stable Sets: A Descriptive and Comparative Analysis’
J. Peris, B. Subiza.
WP1207 ’A Proportional Approach to Bankruptcy Problems with a Guaranteed Minimum.’
J. Peris, J.M. Jimenez-Gomez.
WP1208 ’Solidarity and Uniform Rules in Bankruptcy Problems.’
J. Peris, J.M. Jimenez-Gomez.
WP1209 ’The Cooperative Endorsement of a Strategic Game.’
P. Herna´ndez, J.A. Silva-Reus.
WP1210 ’Strategic Sharing of a Costly Network.’
P. Herna´ndez, J. E. Peris, J.A. Silva-Reus.
WP1211 ’Tax Burden Degree as a Tool to Design Tax Systems.’
J. Alcalde, M.C. Marco-Gil, J.A. Silva-Reus.
WP1212 ’Fair Bounds Based Solidarity.’
J. Peris, J.M. Jimenez-Gomez.
WP1213 ’A Concessions-Based Mechanism for Meta-Bargaining Problems.’
M.C. Marco-Gil, J. Peris, Begon˜a Subiza.
WP1214 ’Neoclassical Growth and the Natural Resource Curse Puzzle.’
Mar´ıa Dolores Guillo´, Fidel Pe´rez-Sebastia´n.
WP1215 ’Perron’s Eigenvector for Matrices in Distribution Problems’
B. Subiza, J.A. Silva, J. Peris.
WP1216 ’Executive Stock Options and Time Diversification’
J. Carmona, A. Leon, A. Vaello-Sebastia.
WP1217 ’Technology Di↵usion and its E↵ects on Social Inequalities’
M. Magalhaes, C. Hellstro¨m.
WP1301 ’A Pareto Eficient Solution for General Exchange Markets with
Indivisible Goods when Indi↵erences Are Allowed’
B. Subiza, J. Peris.
WP1302 ’From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach’
Jose´-Manuel Gime´nez-Go´mez, Antonio Osorio, Josep E. Peris.
WP1303 ’Allocating via Priorities’
Jose´ Alcalde, J.A. Silva-Reus.
WP1304 ’Relative Injustice Aversion’
Luis Jose´ Blas Moreno-Garrido.
WP1305 ’Random Housing with Existing Tenants’
Jose´ Alcalde.
WP1306 ’Cost sharing solutions defined by non-negative eigenvectors’
B. Subiza, J.A. Silva, J. Peris.
WP1401 ’Strategy-Proof Fair School Placement’
Jose´ Alcalde, Antonio Medina-Romero.
WP1402 ’Compromise Solutions for Bankruptcy Situations: A Note’
Jose´-Manuel Gime´nez-Go´mez, Antonio Osorio and Josep E. Peris.
WP1403 ’Conflicting Claims Problem Associated with Cost Sharing of a Network’
Jose´-Manuel Gime´nez-Go´mez, Begon˜a Subiza and Josep E. Peris.
WP1404 ’Heterogeneity, Endogeneity, Measurement Error and Identification of the
Union Wage Impact’
Georgios Marios Chrysanthou.
WP1405 ’A Consensual Committee Using Approval Balloting’
Begon˜a Subiza and Josep E. Peris.
WP1501 ’Algunas Propuestas para la Reforma del Sistema de Financiacio´n de las
Comunidades Auto´nomas de Re´gimen Comu´n.’
A´ngel de la Fuente.
WP1502 ’La Financiacio´n Autono´mica: Una Historia Interminable.’
Marta Espasa.
WP1503 ’Lower Partial Moments under Gram Charlier Distribution: Performance
Measures and E cient Frontiers.’
A´ngel Leo´n and Manuel Moreno.
WP1504 ’Convergence in a Dynamic Heckscher-Ohlin Model with Land.’
Mar´ıa Dolores Guillo´ and Fidel Pe´rez-Sebastia´n.
WP1505 ’Rationalizable Choice and Standards of Behavior.’
Josep E. Peris and Begon˜a Subiza.
WP1506 ’Cognitive (Ir)reflection: New Experimental Evidence.’
Carlos Cueva, In˜igo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Esther Mata-Pe´rez, Giovanni Ponti,
Marcello Sartarelli, Haihan Yu and Vita Zhukova.
WP1507 ’Folk Solution for Simple Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Problems.’
Begon˜a Subiza, Jose´-Manuel Gime´nez-Go´mez and Josep E. Peris.
